Friday, November 20, 2009

For Valour

No excuse: I should have posted this earlier...

Congratulations to all those recognized by the Governor General for either valour or meritorious service last week.

Here are the citations for valour:

Warrant Officer David George Shultz, S.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and St. Albert, Alberta
Star of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. At the first sign of contact, Warrant Officer Shultz formulated and executed a flanking manoeuvre to neutralize the insurgent position. After securing the area and providing a situational report, the patrol was attacked again. Regardless of the risks, Warrant Officer Shultz plunged into intense enemy fire to assess the situation, direct his soldiers and engage the enemy. He repeatedly re-entered the danger zone to extract casualties and execute the patrol’s fighting withdrawal. His leadership and courage inspired his soldiers and prevented further casualties.

***

Master Corporal Michael C. J. Bursey, M.M.V.
Shilo and Brandon, Manitoba; Conception Bay South, Newfoundland and Labrador
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, resulting in numerous serious casualties. While exposed to sustained enemy fire, Master Corporal Bursey repeatedly returned to the vehicle, in which ammunition was exploding in the ongoing fire, to help extract and tend to the casualties. Master Corporal Bursey’s composure and decisive actions ensured critical care for the casualties until their evacuation.

***

Sergeant Martin Joseph Jean Côté, M.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and Lancaster Park, Alberta; Québec, Quebec
Medal of Military Valour

On June 2, 2008, insurgents ambushed a joint Canadian-Afghan patrol in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. As the patrol moved to seek cover, they triggered an improvised explosive device that seriously injured four members. Shaking off the effects of a severe concussion and oblivious to the ongoing attack, Sergeant Côté triaged the casualties, passed vital information to headquarters and began life-saving treatment. With the patrol unable to effectively break contact, he continued to expose himself to intense enemy fire, to treat injuries and encourage wounded personnel during the prolonged fighting withdrawal.

***

Warrant Officer Robin John Crane, M.M.V., C.D.
Edmonton and Morinville, Alberta; Bay Bulls, Newfoundland and Labrador
Corporal Tyler Brian Myroniuk, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta
Medals of Military Valour

On August 4, 2008, insurgent forces surrounded an Afghan National Army company in a complex ambush in the Panjwayi district of Afghanistan. Warrant Officer Crane and Corporal Myroniuk selflessly remained in the danger zone to extract an Afghan casualty and support another Canadian soldier who was caught in the open. Together, they stood against over 30 insurgents using small arms fire and, when their ammunition was depleted, resorted to hand grenades to hold off the enemy. The courage of Warrant Officer Crane and Corporal Myroniuk saved Canadian and Afghan lives and prevented the company from being outflanked.

***

Corporal Mark C. W. Ejdrygiewicz, M.M.V.
Shilo, Manitoba and Lethbridge, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, resulting in numerous serious casualties. While under constant fire from the enemy, Corporal Ejdrygiewicz worked to extract the injured from the vehicle, in which ammunition began exploding, while alternately providing suppressive fire against the insurgents. Corporal Ejdrygiewicz’s selfless courage under fire was pivotal to the protection and treatment of casualties.

***

Master Corporal Brent W. L. Gallant, M.M.V.
Borden and Angus, Ontario; Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia
Medal of Military Valour

On June 2, 2008, a Canadian soldier was wounded during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. Surrounded on three sides, Master Corporal Gallant made his way through heavy enemy machine-gun fire to the casualty’s location and began treatment while using his body to shield the soldier from ricochets. Master Corporal Gallant’s unwavering devotion, courage and decisive actions were critical in the treatment and evacuation of the casualty, and were an inspiration to fellow soldiers of his platoon.

***

Sergeant Russell J. R. Gregoire, M.M.V., C.D.
Shilo, Manitoba; Fort Frances and Timmins, Ontario
Medal of Military Valour

On June 14, 2008, Sergeant Gregoire’s section was ambushed in the Zhari district of Afghanistan. What was initially considered light contact quickly became a concentrated amount of small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire, splitting the section in two. With the lead element taking a serious casualty and in danger of being overrun, Sergeant Gregoire formulated an extraction plan. Regardless of the risks, he led the remainder of the section into heavier fire to provide cover for the beleaguered soldiers’ evacuation. Sergeant Gregoire’s selfless devotion and courage inspired his platoon throughout the three-hour engagement.

***

Sergeant Jayson William Kapitaniuk, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On June 14, 2008, during a major battle group operation in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, elements of C Company were ambushed by insurgent forces. In an attempt to support a platoon that was pinned down under heavy fire, Sergeant Kapitaniuk repeatedly exposed himself to intense enemy fire to regroup his own troops and to relay counter-attack directives. His leadership, determination, and courage were vital to the effectiveness of his unit throughout the engagement and fighting withdrawal.

***

Corporal Jordan E. Kochan, M.M.V.
Shilo, Manitoba and Cochrane, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On September 3, 2008, during an insurgent ambush in the Zharey district of Afghanistan, an anti-tank round destroyed a light armoured vehicle, creating a deadly mass-casualty situation. Exposed to sustained enemy fire and the exploding ammunition from the burning vehicle, Corporal Kochan, then private, assisted and treated one of the wounded soldiers who had been ejected from the vehicle by the blast. With insurgents targeting the casualty collection points, Corporal Kochan’s actions were vital to the treatment and evacuation of casualties.

***

Master Corporal Paul D. Rachynski, M.M.V.
Edmonton and Bonnyville, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. After neutralizing the initial threat, Master Corporal Rachynski selflessly led both Canadian and Afghan soldiers through heavy insurgent fire to rejoin his besieged patrol. Master Corporal Rachynski’s determination and calm under fire allowed his patrol to evacuate the wounded and execute a fighting withdrawal with no further casualties.

***

Corporal Anthony J. R. Rotondi, M.M.V.
Edmonton, Alberta and Hamilton, Ontario
Medal of Military Valour

On May 6, 2008, a Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol was ambushed in the Zharey district of Afghanistan. While exposed to intense enemy fire, Corporal Rotondi assisted two seriously injured fellow soldiers and relentlessly returned fire to allow first aid and casualty evacuation. Corporal Rotondi’s bravery and perseverance in the face of a determined enemy were inspirational to those around him and helped save the lives of fellow soldiers.

***

Warrant Officer Dale Milton Verge, M.M.V., C.D.
Stephenville and Beachside, Newfoundland and Labrador
Medal of Military Valour

On March 30, 2008, insurgents initiated a fierce and persistent attack on an Afghan police sub-station in Spin Pir, Afghanistan. Early in the action, Warrant Officer Verge sustained significant injuries. Oblivious to his wounds, he re-engaged with suppressive fire and directed effective point defence, neutralizing the enemy and repelling the attack. Warrant Officer Verge’s selfless courage, tactical acumen and leadership set an example of resolve and prevented the sub-station from being overrun.


What an exceptional group of people. Reading the citations and the level of danger these men exposed themselves to, I'm amazed none of them are being awarded these decorations posthumously. Indeed, I'm thankful they aren't.

Following are the recipients of the Meritorious Service decorations:

Master Warrant Officer Rodney Albert Dearing, M.S.C., C.D.
Commander Pierre Christophe Dickinson, M.S.C., C.D.
Lieutenant-General Joseph Guy Marc Lessard, C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.
Warrant Officer John Robert McNabb, M.S.C., C.D.
Lieutenant-Colonel Darryl Albert Mills, M.S.C., C.D.
Chief Warrant Officer Giovanni Moretti, M.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.
Brigadier-General Denis William Thompson, O.M.M., M.S.C., C.D.

Major James Edward Allen, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Todd Barry Buchanan, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Jamieson Cade, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Michael Roy Deutsch, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Michael Patrick Forest, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Stacy Allan Grubb, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Joseph Antonio Marcel Louis Hamel, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Charles Mark Hazleton, O.M.M., M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Yann John Hidiroglou, M.S.M., C.D. (Retired)
Warrant Officer Kevin Thomas Johnson, M.S.M., C.D.
Colonel Vihar Govind Joshi, M.S.M., C.D.
Commander Kelly Brian Larkin, M.S.M., C.D.
Master Corporal Tyler J. Latta, M.S.M.
Major John Robert Prudent Latulippe, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Marc L. S. Murray, M.S.M.
Commander Steven Paget, M.S.M., C.D.
Master Corporal Jacob N. Petten, M.S.M.
Warrant Officer Jason Guy Pickard, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Catherine Enid Potts, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal John Clifton Wayne Prior, M.S.M.
Colonel Jean-François Riffou, M.S.M., C.D.
Major Robert Tennant Ritchie, M.S.M., C.D.
Captain (N) Brendan Ryan, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Cameron M. Smithers, M.S.M.
Lieutenant-Colonel Martha-Anne Paule Stouffer, M.S.M., C.D.
Corporal Rory E. Swanson, M.S.M.
Commander John Aubrey Williston, M.S.M., C.D.
Warrant Officer Terence Charles Wolaniuk, M.S.M., C.D.


Bravo Zulu!

Afstan: Shooting the messenger

I think Damian deals well the difficult substantive issues that have been involved in dealing with Afghan detainees. I'm going to look at how the matter is now being dealt with in Canada. I find the government's approach reprehensible.

But first full audio of Richard Colvin's testimony Nov. 18 to the Commons' Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan (I could not find a video).

Then some headlines in chronological order, first two a month ago:
MacKay seeks answers on abuse report
Opposition charges 'wilful blindness,' as defence minister says report about torture concerns didn't get to his desk

THE DETAINEE FILES: Canada's top soldier wants to know fate of missing Afghan reports [with videos]

Afghan detainees surrendered by Canada were tortured: Envoy

Officials dismiss Afghan torture claims

Canada would never participate in a 'war crime,' retired general says

Rick Hillier denies receiving Afghan abuse alert

Critics want Afghan torture case inquiry
Ottawa paints whistleblower as Taliban dupe

Torture issue arose in 2006
Source: Canadian officials discussed suspected abuse
And something to clear up: Mr Colvin is not a "senior" or "top" diplomat as most of our media insist on describing him. He is mid-level, roughly Lieutenant-Colonel equivalent I would think. This story gets much of that right, but (the headline also is completely mis-leading as political types or ministers would have had no involvement in his assignments)...
Colvin groomed in hot-spots around the world by Liberals and Conservatives

The man who is now the target of so much Conservative scorn was thought suitably intrepid to be assigned by his government masters to some of the hottest counter-insurgencies over the past 15 years.

A spokesperson for the Foreign Affairs Department said Richard Colvin, who has unleashed a political tsunami on the government with his stunning testimony about torture in Afghanistan, doesn't rate an official biography because he is a relatively lower-level functionary.

And yet Colvin served out sensitive Foreign Affairs missions in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territory before he was posted to Afghanistan. He is among the rare diplomats who have served in both Moscow and Washington, where he is now a first secretary in the intelligence liaison office...
Oops! From the current version of the official publication:
Canadian Representatives Abroad

United States of America - Washington, D.C.


Mission
The Embassy of Canada to the United States of America, Washington
...
Counsellor [emphasis added] (Political) R. Colvin
There are 18 counsellors at the embassy. Counsellor rank is one above first secretary.

A key point to me is that senior bureaucrats and CF officers apparently took no action for a long time on Mr Colvin's reports of Afghan government abuse/torture of detainees turned over by the CF (such abuse is absolutely common in many parts of the world but that's another story). Then he says a very senior official indeed told him to stop putting things on paper.

A question: if his reporting, on a very serious matter that became a political hot potato in February 2007, was not taken seriously, or was considered seriously flawed, why was no effort apparently made by Foreign Affairs or the CF otherwise to determine what was happening to detainees? The person doing the job was told, in effect, to down tools.

The government is now doing its worst to discredit Mr Colvin. In the Commons' Question Period this morning the government lead, transport minister John Baird, repeatedly maintained Mr Colvin's testimony and reports were not credible. So, if he was not credible in 2006-7, I ask again why was no effort made seriously at that time to find out the real facts? Did people simply not want to know?

It is also passing strange that if Mr Colvin lacked credibility in the eyes of his superiors he nonethless was posted to the very sensitive job of intelligence liaison in Washington, D.C. It's hard trying to have it six ways to Sunday. And it's also pretty reprehensible that top bureaucrats and CF officers are acquiescing in the government's politics of personal destruction.

I have no belief that things would be dealt with much differently under a Liberal government, though perhaps there would be fewer efforts to shoot the messenger. What a sad state of affairs this country is in.

By the way, there was no "first-hand" evidence (what the government decries Mr Colvin for not providing) for the torture of Mahar Arar nor for that of Messrs Almalki, Nureddin and El Maati either. It's not very often that foreign security services torture right in front of Canadian officials or let those officials physically examine prisoners soon after any torture.

Disclosure: I was a foreign service officer with External Affairs from 1974 until 1988, ending up with, er, middle rank.

Update: A judicious, in the best sense, editorial in the Globe and Mail (the editorial board, oddly, seems rather less Globeite agenda-driven that reporters and editors):
The torture and the paper trail
A consistent pattern of looking the other way when informed about the abuse of Afghan detainees would say something disturbing about a whole group of Canadian institutions

Impact of AFG Surge Will Depend on Where/How Surge Happens

While we await the U.S.'s final decision and plan for future troop deployments to Afghaniatan, BruceR over at Flit raises a good point - where any surge goes makes a big difference:
Experience has proved the only way you keep the Afghan police alive and honest long enough for them to make a difference is by living with them 24/7, not by driving out on alternate mornings to see if they’re still breathing. Putting more soldiers into KAF, by contrast, will increase the lineups at the French bistro and the Burger King, but will do absolutely nothing to help Afghans.
More from BruceR here.


Nothing improves if we pull back

Richard Colvin's recent testimony before a parliamentary committee has caused quite the tempest:

All detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan prisons were likely tortured by Afghan officials and many of the prisoners were innocent, says a former senior diplomat with Canada's mission in Afghanistan.

Appearing before a House of Commons committee Wednesday, Richard Colvin blasted the detainees policies of Canada and compared them with the policies of the British and the Netherlands.

...

He said unlike the British and Dutch, Canada did not monitor their conditions; took days, weeks or months to notify the Red Cross; kept poor records; and to prevent scrutiny, the Canadian Forces leadership concealed this behind "walls of secrecy."

"As I learned more about our detainee practices, I came to a conclusion they were contrary to Canada's values, contrary to Canada's interests, contrary to Canada's official policies and also contrary to international law. That is, they were un-Canadian, counterproductive and probably illegal.


I was asked to comment on the situation by the folks at CBC's Connect with Mark Kelley, and if you weren't...ahem...lucky enough to have it on at the time, you can catch the clip here. (My sister-in-law happened to see me on one of the TV's at the gym, but the sound was turned down. Fortunate for her: I'm told I make a much better impression when you can't hear me.)

I've already committed a lot of 1's and 0's to the topic of detainees here at The Torch. If you're not a regular reader, this post sums up most of my thoughts on the issue, and I think lays out the central problem in all of this a bit more clearly than I've seen it anywhere in the MSM. Follow the links there and you'll find other material that adds more context.

There are also a couple of points I didn't have a chance to make in the CBC video or here on the blog in specific reference to the detainee issue.

First, it's worth remembering that the underlying issue with treatment of detainees isn't our procedures, our tracking, or our paperwork. In fact, it's not our anything. It's the Afghan police, judiciary, and penal system.

And by the way, we're already working on improving that. For those who didn't read it at the time, you should meet Kevin Cluett, one of the many unheralded and tireless Canadians working to make Afghanistan a better place. When I was in Kandahar, he was one of only four Canadian corrections officers in all of Afghanistan: one worked with the national government in Kabul, one was a senior leadership mentor for the local prison warden and supervisor of the crew at the KPRT, and two were mentors and trainers to the guards at Sarposa prison. I don't know if this situation has changed, but that small cadre was putting in long and dangerous hours to fix the root of the problem: Afghan prisons. Nobody's talking about that, though - not sexy enough.

And would all those moaning and groaning about what a disgrace this is be willing to surge CSC officers into Kandahar to turbo-charge that valuable program? I doubt it. Even if all the outraged said "yes, we should send more good Canadians from Correctional Services Canada into harm's way," would they also be willing to bump up the number of force protection soldiers keeping them relatively safe, to take more casualties as more vehicles were running up and down the roads between our bases and camps and the Afghan prisons, and to keep the program going past 2011 so it had a realistic chance at effecting a long-term, sustainable cultural change within the Afghan system?

Hands up if you think that's a realistic scenario? Right then. As I've said previously:

It's a fantastic idea.

But here's the kicker: there are a million fantastic ideas to move Afghan society forward, and we simply can't do all of them.

Does it make more sense to spend money on rehabilitating irrigation canals for Afghan food crops so a village can feed itself, or to spend that money on a prison so that incarcerated Taliban fighters get three squares a day? Should we be more concerned with providing a Village Medical Outreach to a hamlet that hasn't seen a real doctor in a decade or more, or with providing basic electrical service to a town, or with stocking a hospital's maternity ward with supplies and equipment, or with training children how to avoid land-mines, or with teaching police how to conduct a decent checkpoint or investigation, or with digging a well and providing a clean water supply to a collection of families without one now, or with building a school where the future of Afghanistan learns to read and add, or with providing a secure pay system for essential workers like doctors and teachers to help curb graft and corruption, or should we really be most concerned with heating a jail in the winter?

That was a run-on sentence, because the list of projects we could undertake would make for a run-on mission if we let it.

At this point, we can't fix everything. We need to focus our efforts on a limited spread of achievable goals. Protecting detainees better than we do is certainly achievable if we want it to be - but what other goals will be sacrificed to make it so?

Right now, this mission is about choices for Canada. It's about the difficult process of triage for an entire nation. Civilized countries are meticulous about human rights, even those of detainees. Has Afghanistan progressed to the point where this is the highest priority?


The other point I wish I'd been able to make properly was actually best put by BruceR at Flit:

You think we had our own jails in Cyprus or Suez? Neve is really arguing that, contra Bono, the world does not, in fact, need more Canada, regardless of whatever future massive human rights violations might seem to warrant Canadian military intervention, because we can't trust the jails of any country that might benefit from that kind of presence.


I have no doubt the plight of detainees in Afghan jails could be improved. No doubt whatsoever.

I have yet to hear a compelling argument, however, that would justify diverting scarce money and attention into a realistic fix, let alone a commitment to putting forth the long-term resources that would be required for that solution.

To those who throw their hands up and say this is yet another reason we should get out altogether, I ask: where will those Afghan prisoners be if we stop trying to help the Afghans build their country's institutions? Better or worse off? Let your righteous indignation chew on that question for a moment.

I suspect that if you're honest with yourself, you'll come to the same unsatisfying conclusion I have: in Afghanistan, if we let the perfect be the enemy of the good, nothing will ever get better.

Update: As usual, BruceR at Flit has some valuable things to say about the Afghan detainee transfer brouhaha, including some personal anecdotes about avoiding the taking of detainees while he was over there mentoring the ANA. Too much paperwork, it seems...here's a snippet:

With detainees, we always seemed to be in one of those perfect catch-22s that typified the ISAF mission. Afghan law said all detainees had to be brought before a judge within 72 hours of capture. This was rigorously enforced. Unfortunately, that made it kind of difficult, given the IED situation and everything else, for mentors to establish any kind of evidentiary linkage with an IED attack or other insurgent activity that would justify their continued detention and deliver detainee and evidence by road to Kandahar in time (if it was ISAF-collected evidence, the declassification and translation processes each would have taken days if not weeks). So by Afghan law, nearly all detainees, both innocent and guilty as hell, should have been promptly released by the judge on sight, and certainly many were.

Perhaps Canadians, who've hadn't taken detainees in a counterinsurgency situation before this since, oh, about 1902, weren't the best people to be instructing the Afghans on how to do this right. And once again, really we were falling afoul of that early handover by the West of Afghan sovereignty, to the point where we really had no control over what normally would be essential processes in a counterinsurgency fight: the courts, the prison system, police questioning. And we tried not to notice how much that subverted our other efforts.


Need I say the whole thing is worth reading?

Thursday, November 19, 2009

New Canadian commander at Kandahar/More US troops to be under his command?

Interesting development, see speculation about the US unit at the end:
The incoming commander of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is preparing to change the focus of counter-insurgency efforts as he deals with the possibility NATO will once again enlarge the area under Canadian control.

Brig.-Gen. Daniel Menard said Thursday he plans to increase troop levels in the province's dangerous capital, [emphasis added, more here] marking a shift from existing strategy concerned largely with rural areas southwest of the city.

"We will be putting a lot of emphasis on Kandahar city," Menard said. "Kandahar city, for me, remains centre of gravity. It is certainly key terrain and it needs to be taken care of."

Menard's efforts in Kandahar city are expected to be bolstered by further additions of U.S. troops, who are likely to fall under Canadian command.

The NATO general in charge of southern Afghanistan, Nick Carter, is slated to issue orders by Monday that could significantly change the territory and resources under Menard's control [British Major General Carter took command of ISAF RC South on Nov. 1 for a year; the next commander will certainly be American, and I would expect the US to keep the command].

According to Menard, up to four more U.S. units could come under Canadian command [emphasis added, see below, perhaps all part of the brigade combat team mentioned].

"This is critical for me in order to move forward," he said. "Number of troops does make a difference."

Menard took over Thursday as commander of Task Force Kandahar from Brig.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, whose so-called "model-village approach" had won praise from Canada's NATO allies.

Current Task Force Kandahar (TFK) Commander, Brigadier General Jonathan Vance, greets the incoming TFK Commander, Brigadier General Daniel Ménard, upon his arrival at the Kandahar Airfield, 15 November 2009. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Handout photo/ Master Corporal Angela Abbey, Canadian Forces Combat Camera


"There is much that others can learn from what the Canadian Task Force [composition here, already includes one US Army infantry battalion along with one Canadian--and a US Army MP battalion may also be under Canadian command] has achieved in the last nine months," Carter said at the transfer of command ceremony.

"Canada had provided a model of how modern counter-insurgency should be prosecuted."

Under Vance, Canada's area of responsibility shrunk by more than half last summer with a surge in U.S. troops [see this post].

He took the opportunity to concentrate Canadian efforts in a series of villages in Dand district [more here], which saw a drop in insurgent activity during his tenure.

But Menard acknowledged the possibility that ISAF headquarters could once again enlarge Canada's area of operation.

"I am expecting some orders over the next two days," he said.
As far as I know no "further additions of U.S. troops" are planned for Kandahar province in the near future; though President Obama may decide to send a fair number, it will be some time before they arrive. I could well be wrong, but it seems unlikely to me that the US Army's combat unit at the province, the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, would be put under Brig.-General Ménard.

But maybe the training/mentoring 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne , now in the province could be put under Canadian command ("Task Force Fury", more here, here, and here--the Illinois National Guard 33rd BCT mentioned at the first link has left Afstan and I have not discovered if it's been replaced, maybe by the MPs for Kandahar). Just speculating about the 4th BCT. But, seeing as the very mobile Stryker BCT is covering Kandahar City in a broad arc from from west to north to south/southeast outside the city, the 4th BCT would seem appropriate for the city itself and immediate environs.

Afstan: I guess it all depends on what the meaning of "leaving office" is (and, silly soothing phrase, "glide path")

But at least "glide path" is bit better than "off ramps". The Afghan president at his second inauguration (the headline of the Times story is misleading):
President Hamid Karzai today signalled the beginning of the end of foreign military intervention in his country, when he pledged that Afghan security forces would take the lead in combating the Taleban over the next three to five years...

Mr Karzai said: “Within the next three years, Afghanistan, with continued international support and in line with the growth of its defence capacity, wants to lead and conduct military operations in the many insecure areas of the country.

“We are determined that by the next five years, the Afghan forces are capable of taking the lead in ensuring security and stability across the country,” he said...

In conjunction with his aim to build up the Afghan security forces, Mr Karzai also pledged to try and make peace with the Taleban, whose insurgency has spread steadily across the country over the past three years.

“We invite dissatisfied compatriots who are not directly linked to international terrorism to return to the their homeland,” he said with clear reference to Taleban figures mainly residing in neighbouring Pakistan. “We will call Afghanistan’s traditional loya jirga [grand assembly] and make every possible effort to ensure peace in our country.”..
That would mean a much reduced need for foreign combat troops by the start of 2015. Now, is President Obama going to aim at having US troops basically out by 2013 or 2017 (the years when a new US president would actually assume office)? I'd bet on the former, in which case he'll be a two years ahead of President Karzai's timeline, a bit of a sticky wicket:
Barack Obama to set out 'end game' for Afghanistan
President Barack Obama has declared for the first time that his review of policy in Afghanistan will contain an exit strategy designed to avoid a "multiyear occupation" [terrible word choice that, fodder for the anti-war zealots].
...
"I am confident that when I announce my decision the American people will have a lot of clarity about what we are doing, how we are going to succeed... and most importantly what's the endgame on this thing," he told CNN.

"Unless you impose that kind of discipline it could end up leading to a multiyear occupation that won't serve the interests of the United States."

He added that he was determined to bring the war to an end before leaving office, though he was not asked if he expected that to be after 2012 or 2016.

"My preference would be not to hand off anything to the next president. One of the things I'd like is the next president to be able to come in and say I've got a clean slate," he said.

His remarks immediately raised concerns among allies that setting a limit on American military involvement would encourage the Taliban to lie low until US troops had pulled out, rather than forcing them to reconcile with the Kabul leadership.

A Western diplomat told the Daily Telegraph: "Reconciliation [see first story] is more likely to happen if the Talibs realise that they cannot simply wait you out.

"A short term surge that makes you look weak once you draw down from it is potentially an incentive to a war of attrition."...
More from the Wall St. Journal:
Debate Shifts to Afghan Exit Plan

President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown have turned the focus of Afghan war planning toward an exit strategy, publicly declaring that the U.S. and its allies can't send additional troops without a plan for getting them out.

The shift has unnerved some U.S. and foreign officials, who say that planning a pullout now -- with or without a specific timetable -- encourages the Taliban to wait out foreign forces and exacerbates fears in the region that the U.S. isn't fully committed to their security...

Mr. Obama isn't asking for the firm, publicly declared handover dates in Afghanistan that were the feature of early Iraq war plans, according to senior administration and military officials.

Instead, the officials said, the administration wants the Pentagon to identify key milestones for Afghanistan to meet, in its governance and the capability of its security forces, and then give a rough sense of when each objective is likely to be achieved. Reaching these goals would allow the U.S. role to shift away from direct combat, allowing troop levels to decline.

Mr. Obama said Wednesday in a CNN interview that he believed his new Afghan policy needed to include an "endgame" because "unless you impose that kind of discipline, [U.S. policy] could end up leading to a multiyear occupation that won't serve the interests of the United States."

Keeping the public eye on an exit strategy -- rather than on how many new troops would be deployed, the subject of much of the U.S. public debate so far -- could also help Mr. Obama sell his strategy at home.

"What the White House wants is a strategic glide path that gives a sense of the path ahead and the time it will take to meet each specific target," the defense official said. "It's not a hard-and-fast timetable for withdrawal."

However, Mr. Brown -- who faces significant, growing U.K. public opposition to the war -- has called for an international conference next year that would come up with a "process for transferring district-by-district to full Afghan control," and set a clear schedule for doing so, beginning as early as next year [more at this post].

If I were an Afghan I'd be losing confidence in the, er, occupiers.

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

BruceR.'s Afghan essentials

1) Today's essential Afghan PowerPoint:
From the CounterInsurgency Center blog, essential info for troops heading to Afghanistan...
2) Today's essential Afghan reading

Gilles Dorronsoro.

Dorronsoro and, singing in a slightly different register, David Kilcullen are shaping the new Conventional Wisdom on Afghanistan virtually as I write. What's out, in this new CW? PRTs, NATO-style OMLTs, and clear-hold-build, at least as a generally applicable model for Afghanistan...

Afstan: Globeites hard at their agenda

From Norman's Spectator:
...

--What the Globe reported on Afstan yesterday

Brown aims for Afghan withdrawal

Britain and other NATO partners could join Canada in withdrawing from active combat in Afghanistan, shifting the war to the Afghans in a process that could begin by the end of next year, according to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Mr. Brown announced in a speech Monday night that he hopes to hold an international conference in London in January to decide on a withdrawal timeline in which his country's 9,000 troops, along with the rest of the NATO force, would hand over power to the Afghan National Army.

--What a former Globester now with the NY Times is reporting today

Brown Vows to Continue War Effort in Afghanistan

As President Obama moves closer to a decision on the United States military’s request for more troops in Afghanistan, the British government has made an unflinching commitment to continue its role as the second largest troop provider in the 43-nation coalition fighting the war.

In the face of opinion polls suggesting that British public opinion has moved sharply against the war in the face of rising British casualties, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and David Miliband, the foreign secretary, used major speeches in the past two days to reaffirm Britain’s determination to fight on in Afghanistan alongside the United States...

Predate: More on Mr Brown here.

Afstan: Slovakia first in hoped-for NATO troop increase

Further to 3) at this post a month ago, it's now official:
Slovakia to add 250 NATO troops to Afghan mission

Slovakia pledged about 250 extra soldiers Tuesday to the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, the first of what British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said would be a series of international reinforcements.

The central European country will double the size of its 246-strong contingent in Afghanistan, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said in a joint statement with Brown following talks in the British capital.

Brown, who has said he is lobbying allies in Europe and elsewhere for as many as 5,000 extra soldiers [see 2) here], said more such announcements were on their way.

"We will be approaching other countries and I believe that, including Britain, maybe 10 countries will be prepared to give extra support in Afghanistan," he said.

NATO's Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in the Scottish city of Edinburgh on Tuesday for an address to the group's parliamentary assembly, has so far steered clear of saying how many extra reinforcements the trans-Atlantic alliance was willing to send to Afghanistan.

He told delegates Tuesday that NATO was leaning toward adopting a new counterinsurgency strategy that would include a substantial number of extra troops — but he did not elaborate...

...neither he nor the Slovak leader said when or where the Slovaks might be deployed. They currently serve in the Afghan province of Kandahar and in Uruzgan alongside Dutch soldiers [emphasis added], but the statement said they could be relocated to "other territorial parts of Afghanistan."..
I'll be very suprised if 5,000 troops are pledged, and will bet that most of those who are will not be for combat, maybe some for training but certainly not mentoring in the field. And I'm very doubtful the biggies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) will contribute much more. As for the Germans:
Germany to extend Afghanistan mission another year

"Ice Pilots" on History Television tonight

First, a post two years ago:
Aging birds in the north

Don't let anyone say Canada has no Commandos up there...

Now today (not exactly a military story, but some of the planes were, via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):
Ice Pilots NWT wildly exhilarating

Keep your nose down, never pull on it.

And, by the way, if you're thinking of planning your wedding destination, or you're thinking of flying off on a second honeymoon, have you ever considered the high Arctic?

Those are just some of the suggestions made in tonight's premiere of the wildly exhilarating new docu-reality series Ice Pilots NWT, about a crew of hardy, hard-ass pilots who fly 1940s-vintage DC-3s and DC-4s across 1.2 million square kilometres of frozen lakes and unforgiving tundra hugging the North Pole [they fly for Buffalo Airways].

These are manly men and manly women, and if there's one thing you don't want to hear -- if you're a rookie passenger huddled among crates of supplies being ferried to mining camps and small communities up north -- it's, "We are having engine issues."

Despite the peppy music and fast editing, Ice Pilots NWT isn't a contrived competition show, like Ice Road Truckers or Survivor: North Pole. It's more of a chronological look at a season of white-knuckle flying in some of the world's most challenging flying conditions, but without the dry, authoritative tone of most workplace documentaries.

As produced by Vancouver filmmaker David Gullason, Ice Pilots NWT has a lively snap and a brisk tone and feel to it. You don't have to be wedged into a tiny cockpit and feel the roar of the engines to appreciate the drama and adventure of Arctic flying.

Ice Pilots NWT truly is a show everyone in the family can watch and enjoy together. (10 p.m., History Television) [emphasis added, program webpage here]...
One video, lots more here:
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